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ABSTRACT
This paper presents the results of an empirical analysis of labor
supply for married couples in NorwaS, based on a new modelling approach.
This new framework is particularly convenient for dealing with'complicated
budget constraints such as the Norwegian case, and it can also account for
restrictions on hours of work.
The purpose of the present paper is to apply the estimated labor
supply model to investigate the effect from different tax reforms. In par-
ticular, we study the effects on labor supply and income distribution when
the 1979 tax rules are replaced by proportional taxes on gross earnings and
lump-sum taxes. The proportional tax rate is derived under the constraint
that the personal income tax revenue should remain unchanged and equal to
the revenue in 1979.
The paper also reports an estimate of the cost of taxation from
changing the tax system. The estimate is based on the equivalent variation
measure.
1. INTRODUCTION
Measuring the cost and redistributive effects of taxation is of
major concern for evaluating tax reform policies. This paper presents a
particular methology for estimating the excess burden and the redistribu-
tive effects of taxation as well as an application of this methodology to
the tax system in Norway, 1979. The methodology we propose is based on a
labor supply model developed and estimated by Dagsvik and Strom (1990).
A key assumption in the model is that the individuals choose from a
set of infinite and countable alternatives called matches. Each match is
characterized by a wage rate, hours of work and non-pecuniary attributes.
Thus, our model may be viewed as an extension of a discrete model with
finite choice sets.
Welfare measurement with discrete choice models has been studied by
Small and Rosen (1981), Hanemann (1982) and Hau (1985). As opposed to Hau
(1985) we assume that the individuals have perfect knowledge of their own
set of opportunities and tastes. A random formulation arises because the
model contains components in the utility structure and in the opportunity
set which are not observed by the econometrician.
The estimated model is used in simulations to demonstrate the
impact on labor supply and income distribution of replacing the actual tax
rules by a proportional tax on gross wage earnings, given a constant total
tax revenue. As a money measure of the utility changes we use the equiva-
lent variation. Alternatively, we could have used the compensating varia-
tion. For arguments in favor of measuring the cost of taxation by equiva-
lent variation we refer to Kay (1980) and Browning (1987).
Since our model is stochastic it is not obvious how an equivalent
variation measure should be defined. Hanemann (1982) suggests three alter-
native approaches. The first alternative is to derive the distribution of
the equivalent variation and then to use the mean of its distribution as
basis for measuring excess burden. The second alternative is to use the
median of the distribution. The third alternative is obtained by equating
the expected utility under the actual and the alternative tax regime. This
third alternative is used by Small and Rosen (1981). While the two first
alternatives imply that the compensating measure is invariant with respect
to a monotone transformation of the utility function, the third one is in-
variant only in the case of no income effects. Our approach is based on the
first alternative. Excess burden is defined as the mean in the distribution
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of the equivalent variation divided by the mean in the distribution of the
tax revenue. The excess burden is calculated within a partial equilibrium
framework in the sense that the wage distribution is kept unchanged when
taxes are changed.
Sections 2 and 3 present the econometric model. Only a brief des-
cription is given and the readers are referred to Dagsvik and Strom (1990)
for further details. Section 4 deals with the estimation results. Section 5
gives the results of various policy simulations including the estimates of
the excess burden of taxation.
2. THE MODEL
In this model the individual (couple) is assumed to choose from a
set of hours-wage packages called matches. A match is defined as a particu-
lar combination of skills offered (by the individual) and qualifications
required to perform specific tasks. We assume that the individual has
perfect knowledge about his opportunities, but due to unobserved heteroge-
neity across individuals the set of feasible matches is viewed as random by
the econometrician. Let z=1,2,... be an enumeration of the matches. Match z
includes fixed hours of work, H(z), wage rate, W(z), qualifications deman-
ded, T2 (z), and skills offered, T3 (z). For non-market matches,
H(z) = W(z) = T2 (z) = T3 (z) = 0.
The individual's economic budget constraint, conditional on match
z, is given by
(2.1) 	C = C(z) 	 f(H(z)W(z)+I)
where C is consumption, I is nonlabor income and f( • ) is the function that
transforms gross income to income after tax. The form of the function f
depends on the tax system and of the rules of social security payments,
etc. It may be non-differentiable, non-concave and even discontinuous at
some points. Tax rules are described and discussed in Appendix 2. Let
(2.2 ) 	T 1 (z) = 0(T ( ),T3(z))
where OM is a "distance" function in the sense that it attains low value
to matches where the difference between skills offered and demanded is
large.
The individuals utility function is assumed to have the form
(2.3) 	 U(C,h,z) = v(C,h,T 1 (z)) + c(z)
where v(h,C,t) is a deterministic function that is quasi-concave in (h,C),
decreasing in h and increasing in C for fixed t. c(z) is a random variable
that is supposed to account for unobserved heterogeneity in tastes. More-
over, the utility function is supposed to depend on how well the individual
is fit for the match measured through T i (z).
As mentioned above the collection of matches feasible to the indi-
vidual is random and consequently the set of feasible attributes and taste-
shifters {H(z),W(z),T(z),c(z)} where T(z) = (T 1 (z),T2 (z)) is random. Speci-
fically, we assume that pi(z),W(z),T(z),c(z)} are the points of a Poisson
process on [0,Nx[0,il]x[0,1] 2 xR with intensity measure
_
(2.4a) W(h,w,t 1 ,t 2 )dhdwdt 1 dt2 • e
e
de
for market matches and
(2.4b) X(0,0,0,0)e-cdc
when h=w=t 1 =t2 =0. Eq. 	 2.4 means that the probability that a match for
which
(H(z)e(h,h+dh),W(z)E(w,w+dw),T(z)qt,t+dt),e(z)E(c,e+dc))
is feasible, is equal to
w(h,w,t i ,t )dhdwdt i dt2 • ede + o(dhdwdt 1 dt2 dc).
We assume that
(2.5a) W(h,w„t 2 ) = pg ig hA3 (wIt2 )g4 t )g5(t2)
and
ffelli(h ' w ' t1 4(h,w,t i ,t2 )dt i dt
His 41(x y,t 4(x,y,t1,t
(2.6a) (1)(h,w,ti,t2
)dxdydt 1 cit 2+0/
 
0 0,040,0,0,0)
for h>0, w>0, t 1 >0, t2 >0 and
(2.6b) (1)(0,0,0,0
eT( 0 :09 0 )--- ,A(U 0,0,0)
4(x,y,t 1 ,t 2 )dxdydt 1 cit 2 Wjiff W(X9Y, 0 ,0 , 04( 0, 0 ,0 , 0 )
(2.5b) w(0,0,0,0) = p(1-g 1 )
where p>0 is a constant g 1 e[0,1], g 2 (h), g3 (wIt 2 ), g4 (t 1 ) and g5 (t 2 ) are
probability densities. As demonstrated in Dagsvik and Strom (1990), g 2 (h)
can be interpreted as the density of feasible hours (relative to the indi-
vidual) offered by the firms. The densities g i , j>2, can be interpreted
similarly. The interpretation of g l is as the fraction of feasible matches
that are market matches. The particular decomposition (2.5a) means that
offered hours and wages are independent. Moreover, offered hours are inde-
pendent of g(z)) and wages are independent of {T i (z)}. These assumptions
are justified as follows: Offered hours of work are often determined by the
nature of the tasks to be performed and by institutional regulations inde-
pendent of wages and individual and firm-specific characteristics. However,
as demonstrated below the assumption of independence between offered hours
and wages does not exclude the possibility of dependence between realized 
hours and wages. The assumption that g3 (wIt2 ) does not depend on t 1 may be
more difficult to defend since one may claim that wages may depend on how
well the individual is fit for the job. However, if we let g3 (wit 2 ) also
depend on t 1 we run into serious identification problems. Anyhow, we
believe that the main wage determinants are the individual qualifications
represented by {T2 (z)}.
Let us now consider the realized hours And wage distribution in the
market. Let (1)(h,w) be the probability density of the realized hours of work
and wages, i.e., the hours-wage combination that corresponds to the match
that yields the highest utility. According to Dagsvik (1988) the Poisson
process assumption and (2.4) imply that
where
(2.7) 	 Igh,w,t 1 ) = v(f(hw+I),h,t 1 ).
The model above is so far a disequilibrium model in which the
opportunity densities must be interpreted as exogenously given. Dagsvik and
Strom op.cit. introduced a concept called quasi-equilibrium (QE). By QE we
mean that the hours, wages and {T(z)} adjust so that the probability
density of the realized hours and wages depends solely on the preference
term tg.) which is fulfilled when offered hours and wages are uniformly
distributed. This means that in a "large" sample the realized market dis-
tribution of hours and wages coincides with the distribution of preferred
hours and wages. However, in a small sample this may not necessarily be
true. The relevant interpretation is that due to market imperfections the
adjustments cannot take place so rapidly so as to ensure perfect equili-
brium.
In reality there are, however, more severe imperfections. Examples
are institutional restrictions imposed by unions and government on hours
and wages. Involuntarily unemployment is another example. These and other
imperfections prevent the equilibrating process of the QE type described
above to take place. Hence, a model of labor supply should allow for a pos-
sible deviation between the unconditional distributions of realized and
preferred hours and wages. In our model we do this by postulating a partial
QE. By this we understand that wages adjust so às to give QE within groups
of matches. A group is identified by a specific level of (H(z),T(z)). We
thus assume that the conditional distribution of realized wages, given
hours and attributes (T(z)), depends solely on preferences. This implies
that the wage rate must be a function of individuals qualifications. It can
then be shown that (2.6) implies
(2.8) 	 W(z) = ii(T 2 (z))
where i(e) is a function that satisfies
(2.9) 	 g 3 (W(t 2 )1t 2 ) = 1/.
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Thus if (2.8) holds the density of offered wage, conditional on
qualifications (as measured by T2 (z)), is uniform.
From (2.8) and (2.9) it follows that the unconditional wage distri-
bution across qualification groups takes the form
(2.10 ' ( 4) = g (t2 00) 
dt2 (w)  
dw      
where i2 ( • ) is the inverse mapping of W(•). By inserting 2.10 into 2.6)
we get the partial QE density of realized hours and wages
(2.11a) 	 (h,w
g 1 exp(ijqh,w))g2 (h)g(w)
g ffexp(qx y))g 2 (x)i(y)dxdy+K(1-g exp( 0,0))





g 1 ffexp(qx,y))g 2 (x)g(y)dxdy+K 1-g 1 )exp(tj 0,0))




ev (C, 0 ,0)
fev ( c , ° , t1) g4(t1)dti
The interpretation of K is as a parameter that accounts for the
value of non-market matches relative to the value of the market matches
evaluated at h=0. In general K may depend on C, but as a consequence of
separability assumptions made in the empirical specification below it
follows that K is independent of C.
3. EXTENSION OF THE MODEL TO NO-PERSON HOUSEHOLDS MARRIED COUPLES)
Let U(C,h F ,hm ,z) denote the household's utility function where hF
and h denote the wife's and the husband's hours of work, respectively. C
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is total consumption of the household and z = (z F ,zm ) indexes the matches
of the wife, zF , and husband, zm , respectively.
The constraints are given by
(3.1 ) 	(h F ,hm ) = (HF(z),Hm(z)),
(3.2) 	 C(z) = f(HF(z)WF(z),H m (z)Wm (z),I)
where HF (z), WF (z), Hm (z) and Wm (z) are the match-specific hours of work
and wages for the wife and for the husband, respectively, I denotes capital
income and f( • ) is the function that transforms gross income into consump-
tion. In the calculation of f( • ) for alternative values of h j , j=M,F, the
details of the tax structure of 1979 are taken into account.
As above let TiF (z) and Tim (z) represent the "distance" attribute
for match z relative to female and male, respectively.
Under assumptions that are straight forward extensions of the
assumptions of the preceding section we can write
(3.3 ) 	U(C(z),HF(z),Hm(z),z)) = v(C(z),HF(z),Hm(z),T1F(z),T1m(z)) + c(z).
The corresponding choice densities under partial QE are straight
forward extensions of (2.11), see Dagsvik and Strom (1990).
4. SUMMARY OF ESTIMATION RESULTS
The estimation of the model is based on a sample of data for
married couples where the femiles are between 27 and 66 years of age and
where the main income of the family comes from wage work.
The deterministic part of the utility function is assumed to have a
Box-Cox form separable in consumption and hours, i.e.,
+ ae, (1 ogAm )2 )
)
a7 	  08 + a9 1ogAF i- al o (logAF ) 2
(4.1 ) 	 ' C,h ,hm E logfexp(v(C,h ,h m ,t1F , 	 ) ) g4 ( t i F, 1 )dt i F dt i m
= 	 (0.0-4C)al v.2
(Lm a3 -
a3 a4 	a logAm
+ a11 CU6 + a12 C06) + ai3 LF Lm
where AF ,Am are the age of the wife and the husband, respectively, CU6 and
C06 are number of children less than 6 and above 6 years, Lk is leisure for
gender k = M,F, defined as
- hk /8760,
and aj , j = 1,2 ...13, are unknown parameters. If a <1, a 1, a <1 a2 >0,
a4 	a5 logA + a6 (1 ogAm ) 2 > 0,
and
a6 	a9 logAF + a10(logAF)2 	 all CU6 + a12 C06 > 0
then ■)(C,h F ,hm ) is increasing in C, decreasing in (h F h ) and strictly
concave in (C,h F ,hm ).
The densities of offered hours, g3k (hk ), k=F,M, are assumed uniform
except for a peak at full-time hours for males and peaks at full-time and
part-time hours for females. The peaks reflect our assumption that observed
concentrations of hours around these two working loads are due to restric-
tions set by firms, unions and government.
Above we assumed that the opportunity distributions for hours were
uniform except for full-time and part-time peaks. Unless this or analogous
assumptions are made it is not possible to separate some of the structural
coefficients in the mean utility function from the parameters of the
opportunity densities for hours.
It is of interest to note that since the logarithm of the opportu-
nity density of hours and the utility function enter symmetrically into
1 0
(2.11a) it would be possible to interpret the peaks as stemming from prefe-
rences in which case the offered hours would be generated by a uniform dis-
tribution. In fact, if preferences and the opportunity density of hours are
kept fixed we can perform policy simulations with respect to changes in de-
mographic variables, taxes and wage rates based on the estimated model that
are • consistent with either interpretation.
The wage densities are specified as follows
(4.2) 	 logWk(z) = 00k 1- OlkSk 	 02kEXN 	 p3k (Expk ) 2 + 	 (z)
k = F,M, where (11 F (z),qm (z)) are jointly normally distributed, sk denote














logi =a +as+a + a17-14 - -15 -F - -16 	 -g11
According to the discussion in Dagsvik and Strom (1990) it is pos-
sible to separate KF, Km and KFM from the opportunity densities g• i ,
i,j=0,1, by applying data on unemployment. However, since the unemployment
rate in 1979 was rather low, close to 1 per cent, we found it of minor
importance to separate KF, Km and KFM from gip
The estimation is based on a procedure suggested by McFadden (1978)
which yields results that are close to the full information maximum likeli-
hood method. We are not able to use the exact likelihood function to esti-
mate the model because the evaluation of the integrals in the denominator
of the two-person household version of (2.11a) would be too costly and cum-
bersome. The estimation procedure applied replaces the continuous four-
tuple integral in the denominators of the densities by a sum over 30,
(alternatively 70), random points, where each term in the sum is adjusted
by appropriate weights. In other words, the continuous logit-type model is
replaced by a discrete version. McFadden has demonstrated that this method
yields consistent and asymptotically normal parameter estimates.
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The results of the estimation are reported in Table 1 and 2.
Note that most parameters are rather precisely determined (apart
from the cross leisure term) and they have the theoretically expected
signs.








a l 	0.895	 19.8
a2 	1.881	 9.2
1 a3 	-15.531	 7.6a4 	 .429	 1.4a5 	-2.299	 1.4a8 , 	 0.306 	 1.4
a7 	-2.125	 4.3





Leisure interaction term 	 an 	 2.179 	 0.5
1 0(14 	 1.699 	 2.2an 	-0.247 3.3
...
Male opportunity density 	 als 	 2.644 	 6.8
Interaction 	a1 7 	1.423	 3.8
Full-time peak, males 	 an) 	 0.499 	 3.8
Full-time peak, females 	 a 	4.1
Part-time peak, females 	 a20 	 0.278 	 2.0
Female opportunity density
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OLS 	 taneous 	 OLS 	 taneous
ML 	 ML
Intercept ... ............. 	 3.036 	 2.711 	 2.657 	 2.730
	
(84.8) 	 (39.6) 	 (53.5) 	 (35.2)
Education .. 	 .......... 	 0.036 	 0.045 	 0.051 	 0.047
	
(13.7) 	 (13.3) 	 (13.1) 	 (9.8)
Experience ..... ............. 	 0.018 	 0.022 	 0.018 	 0.008
	
(9.7) 	 (6.4) 	 (8.8) 	 (2.1)
(Experience squared).10 -2 ...•• 	 -0.036 	 -0.036 	 -0.030 	 -0.012
	
(8.1) 	 (6.2) 	 (7.5) 	 (1.7)
Standard error .. .............. 	 0.101 	 0.172
	
(36.0) 	 S 	 (33.6)
R22 0.23 0.23............................0.23
*).t-values in parenthesis.
Figures 1 and 2 give the observed and simulated distributions for
hours of work. These figures demonstrate that the model is able to repro-
duce the observed distributions quite well.
In Table 3 we report what we have called aggregate elasticities. By
this we understand the elasticity of the mean (male and • female) labor
supply with 'respect to 1 per cent changes in the individual wage rates,
respectively. The Cournot elasticity of, for example, female labor supply
is obtained by calculating the relative change in the mean female labor
supply. (over all females in the sample) that results from a 10 per cent
wage increase. The Slutsky elasticities are derived in an analogous way
except that for each household the utility is kept fixed at the pre-wage-
increase level. Note that the "estimates" in Tables 3 and 4 are based on 10
sets of simulations and that the standard deviations inform about the simu-
lation uncertainty. Table 4 provides information about elasticities for
male and female members of poor and rich households.
As reported above the deterministic part of the utility function
or, more precisely, the mean utility across feasible matches for given w
and h, is a concave function in C and h. The random tasteshifter and the
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latent rationing on hours will, however, counteract this concavity. The
aggregate Slutsky elasticity derived from this labor supply model can thus
be negative.









Cross 	 Own 	 Cross
wage
	
elast. 	 wage 	 elast.
elast. 	 elast.
Elasticity of the probability
of participation
Cournot 	 0.251 	 -0.078 	 0.735 	 -0.219
(0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.008)
Slutsky 	 0.222 	 -0.084 	 0.738 	 -0.158
(0.021) 	 (0.015) 	 (0.027) 	 (0.011)
Elasticity of conditional
expectation of total supply
of hours
Cournot 	 0.085 	 -0.039 	 0.741 	 -0.204
(0.002) (0.004) (0.007) (0.008)
Slutsky 	 0.101 	 -0.023 	 0.791 	 -0.122
(0.010) (0.014) (0.039) (0.013)
Elasticity of unconditional
'expectation of total supply
of hours
Cournot 	 0.338 	 -0.116 	 1.531 	 -0.418
(0.005) (0.005) (0.011) (0.014)
Slutsky 	 0.326 	 -0.107 	 1.587 	 -0.278
(0.023) (0.017) (0.051) (0.018)
*) Standard deviations in parenthesis.
As seen from Table 3 female labor supply is considerably more
elastic than male labor supply. The elasticity of unconditional expectation
of total , supply of hours is 1.5 for females and 0.3 for males. Note that
the cross elasticities are substantial and negative. The impact of an
overall increase in wage levels will thus be smaller than increases in male
and female wages taken separately.
A striking result reported in Table 4 is that the wage elasticities
are declining with household income. This is the case for Cournot as well
as Slutsky elasticities. The elasticities among the poorest in the popula-
tion is an order of magnitude higher than among the rich. The high values
of the utility constant elasticities, the Slutsky elasticities, among the
poorest individuals indicate that there might be a substantial loss in
taxing wage earnings of the poorest in the society. The own wage elastici-
ties among the 10 per cent richest are close to zero.
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The cost of taxation depends on the labor stiliply responses to
changes in tax rates across individuals as well as on the structure and
level of taxes. The Norwegian tax system as of 1979 was rather complex with
high marginal tax rates but generous rules of deductions. Thus, the elasti-
cities in Tables 3 and 4 give imcomplete information about the cost of
taxation. A separate analysis of the cost of taxation is, however, reported
in Section 5.
Table 4. Aggregate labor supply elasticities * ) for male and female members of the 10 per cent
poorest and the 10 per cent richest households under the 1979-rules
Male elasticities 	 Female elasticities
Type of elasticity
	
Own wage 	 Cross 	 Own wage 	 Cross
elasticities elasticities elasticities elasticities
1.89 (.06 ) 	 -1.04 (.05) 	 1.85 (.07) 	 -1.44 (.07)
	Cournot II	 0.09 (.003) -0.08 (.004) 	 0.66 (.008) -0.29 (.005)
. Elasticity of the 	 III 	 0.03 (.004) 	 0.01 (.003) 	 0.07 (.006) 	 -0.03 (.011)
probability of
participation 	 2.71 (.35) 	 0.41 (.09) 	 2.62 (.28) 	 0.21 (.21)
	Slutsky II 	 0.07 (.01) 	 -0.12 (.01) 	 0.73 (.03) 	 -0.19 (.02)
	III	 0.01 (.01) 	 -0.05 (.02) 	 0.03 (.03) 	 -0.11 (.03)
0.29 (.02) 	 -0.15 (.02) 	 1.04 (.04) 	 -1.04 (.07)
	Cournot II	 0.07 (.002) -0.09 (.004) 	 0.78 (.009) -0.29 (.006)
Elasticity of	 III 	 0.03 (.005) -0.01 (.005) 	 0.12 (.013) -0.06 (.017)
conditional expectation
of total supply of hours 	 I 	 1.11 (.12) 	 0.47 (.11) 	 2.39 (.24) 	 0.42 (.24)
	
Slutsky II 	 0.09 (.02) 	 -0.05 (.01) 	 0.97 (.05) 	 -0.17 (.01)
	III	 0.01 (.01) 	 -0.02 (.01) 	 0.05 (.01) 	 -0.04 (.02)
2.23 (.06) 	 -1.18 (.05) 	 3.09 (.08) 	 -2.33 (.11)
	Cournot II	 0.16 (.003) -0.17 (.004) 	 1.49 (.012) -0.57 (.009)
Elasticity of 	 III 	 0.06 (.006) -0.01 (.004) 	 0.19 (.013) -0.08 (.017)
unconditional expectation
of total supply of hours 	 4.15 (.49) 	 0.88 (.15) 	 5.68 (.58) 	 0.68 (.45)
	
Slutsky II 	 0.16 (.02) 	 -0.17 (.02) 	 1.77 (.07) 	 -0.35 (.03)
III 	 0.02 (.02) 	 -0.07 (.02) 	 0.07 (.03) 	 -0.15 (.05)
Note that I 	 10 per cent poorest household
II = 80 per cent in the middle of the consumption distribution
III = 10 per cent richest household








Figure 1. Observed and simulated hours of work for females
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Figure 2. Observed and simulated hours of work for males
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Figur 3. Observed and simulated consumption for
married couples
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This section describes the nature and the purpose of the simulation
experiments. It should be noted that our model is a labor supply model
which treats wages as exogenous variables. Hence we are only able to
perform conditional simulation experiments, given the wage distribution or
given specified changes in wage levels.
For expository reasons consider the one-person household model. Let
V(h,w) denote the conditional indirect utility defined by
(5.1) 	 V(h,w) = max(v(C(z),H(z),T 1 (z)) + e(z)).
given H(z) = h,W(z) = w.
It can easily be demonstrated that
Val(z),W(z)) = (H(z),W(z)) + i(z)
where 	 is defined by (2.12) and where fli(z),W(z),i(z)) are the points of a
Poisson process with intensity measure
pg 2 (h)g(w)dhdw • e-cde .
Since we have estimated g 2 (h),g3 ( ), k(1-g 1 )/g 1 and ii(h,w) we are
able to perform policy simulations (changes in tax rates and in the wage
distribution) provided it makes sense to keep the opportunity density
g 2 (h), K, and the fraction of feasible market matches, g l , unchanged. The
density of offered hours, g2 (h), is assumed to be determined by institutio-
nal constraints and firm-specific hours of regulations. These constraints
are not likely to change as a consequence of say, changes in the tax
system.
To keep g i constant in the simulations may appear more controver-
sial. If g l is kept unchanged when say, tax rates are changed, this means
that the individual sets of feasible market matches are unaffected by the
tax rate changes. This assumption thus implies that the total number of
jobs increases (decreases) with increasing (decreasing) labor supply.
Again, this stresses the fact that this is not an equilibrium model but a
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labor supply model. This fact should be kept in mind in the interpretation
of the simulation results.
One purpose of the simulation experiments is to examine the influ-
ence of certain tax reforms on labor supply, income levels and income in-
equality among households (married couples with or without children). The
basic income concepts are gross income (Y) and disposable income (equal to
consumption C) defined as;
(5.2)
	
= wF h + wm hm + I l + I
and
(5.3)
	 - S(wF h F ,wm h 	 ),
where I i and 1 2 are taxable and non-taxable non-labor family income and S
is the tax function.
Income inequality is examined by employing a transfer sensitive in-
equality measure. This measure of inequality, denoted the A-coefficient, is
discussed in Aaberge (1986). The A-coefficient has a similar geometric
interpretation as the Gini-coefficient, but gives more weight to transfers
that occur in the lower part of the distribution. The maximum attainable
value of the A-coefficient is 1, which corresponds to the distribution
where one family has all income, while the minimum attainable value is 0,
which corresponds to perfect equality. The mathematical definition and some
other relevant information are given in Appendix 4. As a supplement to the
information from the A-coefficient, corresponding results for the Gini-
coefficient are given in Appendix 4.
Simulations of the model can be carried out as follows: First draw
whether a match is a market match for one or both adults of the household
according to the "probabilities" g 11, glO K F , g014 , g00 FM* Second, draw n
points,
{HF (z) ,H (z),W F (z ,1444(z),e(z)), 	 1,2,..., n.
Here {H F (z)} and {Hm (z)} are drawn from uniform distributions with
full- and part-time peaks, {41 F (z)} and {Wm (z)} are drawn from lognormal
distributions according to the wage equations and {e(z)} are drawn from the
extreme value distribution, exp(-e -c ). Third, find the realized hours and
A 	 A 	 A
wages (HF (z),Hm (z),WF (z),Wm (z)) by maximizing
•
T(HF(z),Hm(z),WF(z),Wm(z)) + c(z)
with respect to z = 1,2,...,n. Repeat this procedure for every household in
the sample. When n is large this procedure yields results that are close to
an "exact" simulation of the model.
The simulation procedure we have followed in the present paper is a
refinement of the one described above and it is unbiased for finite n and
more efficient. This procedure will be described and analyzed elsewhere.
5.1. Proportional taxes on gross earnings and lump-sum taxation
Two major changes of the tax system are considered in this section.
Tables 5 and 6 give the results of three different simulations. Simulation
1 is based on the actual 1979 tax rules. In simulation 2 the 1979 rules are
replaced by proportional taxes on gross earnings. The proportional tax rate
is derived under the constraini that total tax revenue should be as under
the actual 1979-system (simulation 1). This tax rate is found to be 21.5
per cent. In simulation 3 the alternative system considered is lump-sum
taxes. The lump-sum amounts are obtained from the conditions that each of
the households should have utility levels as in simulation 1 ("1979
rules").
We start with commenting on the lump-sum case. Although it is im-
possible to practice this system, it is of some interest to study the
results of lump-sum taxation. By definition all distortive effects of taxa-
tion are removed and it should therefore bring forward the labor supply
potential in the economy. From Table 5 we observe that the participation
rate among females increases from 0.73 under 1979 rules to 0.94 under lump-
sum taxes. Annual hours supplied in the total population increase by 106
per cent in the case of females and by 25 per cent in the case of males. If
we only consider those who participate, annual hours increase by 41
per cent among females and by 16 per cent among males. Relative to the 1979
rules lump-sum taxation increases the gross incomes by 63 per cent which
indicates the potential increase in earnings from this type of tax reforms.
When all individual lump-sum taxes are aggregated, we get a total
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tax revenue of NOK 60 700 which is 59 per cent higher than the tax revenue
under the 1979 rules. Thus, the excess burden of taxation, when 1979 rules
are compared to lump-sum taxes, is 59 per cent. This burden is rather high
and indicates severe losses from collecting taxes through the 1979 tax
system. Moreover, Table 6 also demonstrates that lump-sum taxes will reduce
income inequality among households. The main explanation is that the gross
income inequality is less under lump-sum taxes than under the 1979 rules.
Lump-sum taxation reduces the differences in hours supplied, particular
among females.
A tax reform of more practical interest is to replace the 1979
rules by proportional taxes on gross earnings (simulation 2 in Tables 5 and
6). From Table 5 we observe that labor supply increases by introducing this
reform, but not to the same extent as under lump-sum taxes. Labor supply
(total hours of work) is 52 per cent higher for females and 19 per cent
higher for males when proportional taxes replace the 1979 rules. Gross
household income increases by 40 per cent, or approximately 63 per cent of
the increase obtained when the 1979 rules are replaced by lump-sum taxes.
Thus, 63 per cent of the potential increase in this part of GNP can be
achieved by proportional taxes on wage earnings.
Table 6 suggests that the inequality in the distribution of dispos-
able income is lower under proportional taxes than under the 1979 rules.
One reason for this rather striking result is that the introduction of a
proportional tax on wage income leads to a considerable reduction in gross
income inequality. In order to understand this result it is important to
recall that the deduction opportunities under the 1979 tax system have
undermined the progressive and redistributive effects of the rather steep
tax schedule in Norway. The most common deductions are related to interest
payments on loans. The last column of Table 6 gives the ratio between the
A-inequalities of the distributions of disposable and gross income and can
be interpreted as an aggregate estimate of the degree of progression.
Thus, the conclusion is that if the 1979 rules are replaced by pro-
portional taxes, this reform will stimulate the economy without the costs
of increasing income inequality.
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Table 5. Participation rates, annual hours of work, gross income, taxes and disposable income
(NOK) for couples under three different tax regimes. Means
Partici- 	 Annual hours 	 Gross 	 Dis-
pation 	 of work 	 Gross earnings 	 income 	 Taxes 	 posable
rates 	 income
F 	M	 F 	M	 F 	M	 Households
Simulation 1:
1979 tax rules 	 0.73 	 0.93 	 1 000 	 2 038 	 32 000 	 88 300 	 131 000 	 38 100 	 92 900
Simulation 2:
Proportional
taxes') earnings 	 0.83 	 0.99 	 1 519 	 2 428 	 54 300 	 119 500 	 183 500 	 38 100 	 145 400
Simulation 3:
Lump-sum taxes 2 ) 	 0.94 	 1.00 	 2 061 	 2 550 	 75 200 	 128 700 	 213 700 	 60 700 	 153 000
1 ) The proportional tax rate (21.5 per cent) on gross earnings is derived from simulation on
the model under the restriction of a constant tax revenue equal to the revenue under the
1979 rules.
- Individual lump-sum taxes are derived from simulation on the model given that each house-
hold's utility level should be equal to the level under the 1979 rules.
Table 6. A-inequality*) in distributions of annual hours of work, gross,




Annual hours 	 Gross 	 Gross Dispos- aggre-
of work 	 earnings 	 income able 	 gate
income progres-
sion
F 	M	 F 	M	 Households
Simulation 1:
1979 rules 	 .673 	 .318 	 .697 	 .387 	 .313 	 .272 	 .87
(.11) .014) 	 (.010) 	 (.013) 	 .009) 	 .009)
Simulation 2:
Proportional
taxes on 	 .574 	 .169 	 .619 	 .284 	 .263 	 .263 	 1.00
earnings 	 (.012) 	 .010) 	 .010) 	 .009) 	 (.007) 	 .007)
Simulation 3:
Lump-sum taxes 	 .438 	 .128 	 .494 	 .247 	 .205 	 .211 	 1.03
(.12) (.004) 	 (.011) 	 (.006) 	 (.006) 	 .005)
*) Standard deviations in parenthesis.
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Figure 4. M-curves of the distribution of gross
household income under two alternative tax regimes,
the 1979 system and proportional taxes.




	 Proportional taxes on wage earning with tax
revenue as under the 1979 system
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Figure 4 shows how proportional taxes lead to a reduction in gross
income inequality among households. The curve displayed in figure 4 is
denoted the M-curve. It is a transformation of the income distribution onto
[0,1] which is one to one except for scale transformations. The formal de-
finition is given in Appendix 3. A point on this curve, (u,M(u)), gives an
estimate of the expected income in the poorest u-fraction of the population
relative to the expected income in the total population, The higher up in
the diagram the M(u)-curve is located, the more equal is the income distri-
bution. The area between the horizontal line 1 and the M-curve is equal to
the A-coefficient reported above.
5.2. Excess burden
In the discussion so far we have neglected the fact that the costs
of increased efforts is a reduction in leisure. We therefore now turn to a
money measure of the changes in utility and to an estimate of the cost of
taxation based on this measure.
This section reports the simulation results i of the excess burden of
taxation when the 1979 rules are compared to a system of proportional taxes
on gross earnings. Excess burden is examined by employing the ratio between
the mean level of equivalent variations and the initial mean tax revenue as
a summary measure of the cost of taxation.
Let K denote the level of equivalent variation of a household
defined by
V(f 1 ,0) . = V(fo ,K)
where V(f,K) is given by
V(f,K) = maxU(K+C(z),H F (z),Hm (z),z)
and Cis given by (3.2) and (5.3).
fo denotes the 1979 rules and fl denotes the above mentioned system
of proportional taxes on gross earnings with a tax rate approximately equal
to 20 per cént.
Recall that the indirect utility is stochastic and its values can
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be obtained by inserting the values of hours, wages and the taste-shifter
that correspond to the optimal match. Since the indirect utility is random,
so is K.
The results from this simulation experiment show that no household
is loosing by the introduction of a proportional tax system. The expected
level of K relative to initial tax revenue is estimated to be 48.4 per
cent. This is (by definition) lower than the excess burden when the 1979
rules are compared to lump-sum taxes. If we add initial taxes and the com-
pensation payment, then this sum amounts to 93 per cent of the lump-sum
transfers. This clearly demonstrates the potential economic gain from a tax
reform along these lines.
Table 8 displays the results on some key characteristics of the
households that are worse and better off, respectively, when we switch to a
proportional tax system. We observe that all households are gaining from
this reform. Th 10 per cent households that are worse and better off gain
on average NOK 1 600 and NOK 45 400, respectively. Wage rates and labor
supply, participation as well as the annual hours worked, are lower among
those who are worse off than among the households that are better off.
Tables 9 and 10 give some characteristics of the households in the
10 per cent lower and upper parts of the distribution of disposable income
under the 1979 rules. The first line gives the characteristics under the
1979 rules and the second line gives the characteristics of the very same
households under a system of proportional taxes on gross earnings.
Table 7. Equivalent variations*) (K); 1979 rules versus proportional taxes
on wage earnings
Mean level of K
NOK
Mean level of K 	 Inequality
relative to mean level
of tax revenue, per cent 	 A 	 G  
	18 400
	











































































































































































































































































Only 17 per cent of the 10 per cent poorest households with respect
to consumption under the 1979 rules still stay in this fraction of the
population after the tax-change. The mean level of the equivalent varia-
tions in this group is NOK 7 100, while the remaining 83 per cent on
average gain 19 700 from the change of the tax, system.
Approximately one of four households among the 10 per cent richest
still stay in this part of the population after the tax change and their
mean equivalent variation is NOK 62 500. The remaining 75 per cent of the
richest move to the middle part of the consumption distribution and have
mean equivalent variation equal to NOK 39 000.
We notice from Tables 9 and 10 that the 10 per cent poorest house-
holds increase their labor supply and hence, their gross earnings, far more
that the 10 per cent richest when a proportional tax replaces 1979 rules.
This is in accordance with the wage elasticity results reported above. An
important reason why is that among the 10 per cent poorest households the
initial marginal tax rates exceed the flat rate of 21.5 per cent, but the
average tax rates are lower than 21.5 per cent. Thus, in this poorer group
of the population both the substitution and the income effect have the same
sign and imply a higher labor supply. Among the 10 per cent richest the
marginal tax rates are higher than the flat rate of 21.5 per cent, but so
are also the average rates. In this group the income effect is negative
which contributes to a lower total impact on labor supply from lower margi-
nal taxes than is the case for the 10 per cent poorest households.




rate 	 supplied 
Earnings 
Gross 	 Dispos-
income 	 Taxes 	 able
(1000 	 income
NOK)       
F 	M	 F 	M	 F 	 M 	 Households
Under the 1979 rules .47 	 .51 	 496 , 892 	 14 800 	 28 100 	 52 500 	 9 600 	 42 800
Proportional taxes 	 .81 	 .95 	 1 389 	 2 187 	 51 000 	 98 100 	 158 700 	 33 200 	 125 400
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Table 10. Characteristics of the 10 per cent richest households under the 1979 rules
Partici-
pation 	 hours
rate 	 supplied 
Earnings 
Gross 	 Dispos-
income 	 Taxes 	 able
(1000 	 income





1979 rules 	 .95 	 .99 	 1 957 	 2 384 	 75 100 	 118 600 	 213 100 	 72 000 	 141 000
Proportional
taxes 	 .99 	 1.00 	 2 078 	 2 470 	 81 600 	 128 800 	 229 700 	 46 400 	 183 300
6. CONCLUSIONS
In recent years important developments in the estimation of labor
supply have taken place. The most well known and widely applied approach is
the Hausman type model, Hausman (1980). The contribution made by applying
this model was the specification of the budget constraint that allowed for
non-convex budget sets. In most countries marginal tax rates are not uni-
formingly increasing with income which creates a non-convexity in budget
sets. The Hausman model is, however, rather restrictive since so far it has
Proved tractable only for linear and possibly quadratic labor supply
curves. Moreover, imperfections in the labor market have been excluded from
the analysis.
The labor supply model applied in this paper, described in detail
in Dagsvik and Strom (1990), allows for a detailed specification of complex
budget constraints together with rather 9eneral specifications of the
utility function.
The model allows for a deviation between preferred and offered
hours and wages. A deviation of this type occurs if there are market imper-
fections preventing skills, wages and hours to adjust so that a perfect
equilibrium is generated.
The estimated model is applied to simulate the impact of changes in
tax rules on labor supply and income distribution. Specifically, the model
is applied to simulate the impact of replacing the tax rules as of 1979 by
a proportional tax on wage earnings. The simulation results show that a
flat tax rate of 21.5 per cent on gross earnings will give the same tax
revenue as the existing tax rules. Labor supply is stimulated to a large
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extent, especially among females. An interesting result is that the labor
supply of the poorest individuals is far more responsive than among the
richest individuals. The inequality in the distribution of gross income is
thus reduced which implies the rather surprising result of almost no impact
on the inequality in the distribution of after-tax income from replacing
the progressive tax rules as of 1979 by a flat tax rate on gross earnings.
It should be noted, however, that liberal deduction rules undermined the
otherwise progressive effects of the steep tax schedule as of 1979.
The model is applied to simulate the excess burden of taxation
measured as the mean in the distribution of equivalent variation relative
to the mean of initial taxes paid. Specifically, it is shown that the
excess burden of the 1979 tax rules relative to a system of a proportional
tax on wage earnings is as high as 48 per cent. Thus, substantial costs of
taxation are indicated and support the view that the gain of tax reforms
along the lines analysed here and implemented during the 1980s in some
countries could be quite high.
Our analysis also shows that the equivalent variations vary across
individuals with the highest amount occuring in the upper part of the
income distribution. This result is not inconsistent with the finding that
the labor supply is more responsive among the poor than among the rich.
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Appendix 1. Data
The data are obtained from two different data sources with informa-
tion about couples in Norway that are married (not cohabitating) through
1979. The first source is based on a questionnaire and contains data on
hours worked (by intervals), wage rates and socio-demographic variables
such as the number and age of children and education level. The other
source is based on filled in and approved tax reports and yields detailed
information about reported incomes, legal deductions, taxes paid and trans-
fer payments received. The two sets of data are linked on the basis of per-
sonal identification numbers. The Central Bureau of Statistics has been re-
sponsible for collecting and preparing the data sets. The data based on the
tax reports have been used to check the answers on the wage rates and hours
worked given in the questionnaire. For around 90 per cent of those working
the reported wage rate has been used Hours worked per year are obtained by
dividing the reported labor income per year by the reported wage rate (or
the predicted rate in some few cases).
The sample selection rules are as follows. Only couples where the
age of the husband is less than 66 years and the age of the wife is between
27 and 66 years are included. Those couples for which one or both spouses
have entrepreneurial income that exceeds wage income are excluded. Couples
for which the wife or husband have reported hours of work above 3000 hours
per year are excluded. When the reported female wage rate below 15 or above
56 NOK it is predicted by a wage equation. The same procedure is followed
when the male wage rate is below 24 or above 74 NOK. The resulting sample
size is 778. Not working is defined as working less than or equal to 60
hours per year. In table Al we report sample statistics for some selected
variables.
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Table Al. Sample Values - Married Couples
Standard 	 Min. 	 Max.
Averages 	 deviations 	 values 	 values
Hours worked per year by wife 	 919 	 859 	 0 	 3 368
Hours worked per year by
husband ...... ................ 	 2 059 	 740 	 	 3 572
Female wage rate, NOK per hour
(among those who work) .... ... 	 31.30 	 6.10 	 15.50 	 55.80
Male wage rate, NOK per hour
(among those who work) .. 	 .. 	 41.60 	 9.4 	 24.00 	 73.90
Female labor income, NOK
per year ..... ............... . 	 30 021 	 29 914 	 0 	 152 497
Male labor income, NOK per
year ..... ................ . . . . 	 84 911 	 35 701 	 	 185 988
Female pension income, NOK
	
per year ..... .............. . .. i 247 	 5 477 	 0 	 51 539
Male pension income, NOK per
year ......... ................ 	 2 538 	 10 410 	 	 86 988
Other female income, NOK per
year ...... ................... 	 132 	 1 746 	0	 34 480
Other male income, NOK per
year . 	 .. .... OOOOO 4. 	 ....... 	 802 	 3 957 	 0 	 35 338
... .... w.f.. 	 . . 	 88 739 	 26 191 	 20 554 	 222 325
Capital income of the house-
hold, NOK per year .... ....... 	 2 536 	 7 842 	 0 	 162 734
Wife's education in years .. .. 	 10.5 	 1.7 	 9.0 	 17.5
	
11.4 	 2.5 	 9.0 	 18.0
Age of the wife ... 	 . 	 .... 	 43.6 	 11.3 	 27 	 66
Age of the husband .... 	 46.1 	 11.5 	 25 	 66
Number of children below 6 ... 	 0.36 	 0.66 	 0 	 4




per cent  	 92.8 	 25.9
Consumption
Husband's education in years
per cent 	
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Appendix 2. Norwegian tax rules as of 1979
In a condensed form the tax rules can be described as follows:
Let Rj , Yi , Q j denote the net and gross taxable income and deduc-
tions for spouse j, j=F,M, respectively. Taxes and levied on net income
according to the tax functions S 1 (.) when the spouses are jointly taxed,
and by S2 (.) when they are taxed separately. Minor parts of the taxes are
based on gross income according to the rule denoted by the function S ).
Thus, taxes paid by the household, S, is defined as
MIRA + ISG (Y i ) when (Rm ,R ) E J
(A.1 S(Rm,RF,Ym,YF) =
j
[S2 (R) + S (Y i )] when (Rm ,RF ) E 2
where R = [0,0140,.1 and J is defined as the region of R 	 which
(A.2) Rj < Ro for at least one
(A.3) Ri 	 Yi 	 Qj
and where Ro is given by the tax rules.
It is up to the households to decide whether they prefer to be
taxed separately or jointly. In 1979 the upper level of R. that minimized
the total taxes paid by the households when they were jointly taxed was NOK
22 000.
Deduction are defined as
(A.4) 	 Q i 	max[Qmin ,T]
where Qmin is a minimum tax allowance that every taxpayer has the right to
deduct. However, expenses such as interest on loans, union fees, travel
expenses over and above a given limit are also deductible. (r! denotes theJ
actual deduction legitimately claimed by the taxpayer.
The minimum allowance, Qmin , depends on gross income according to
rules set out in table A2.
Taxes related to net income follow from the rules reported in table
A3.
Taxes on gross income are given by the rule given in table A4.
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In addition to the deduction and tax rules outlined so far there
are some special transfer payments related to the number of age of children
in the household. For children below 17 years of age the parents received
(in 1979) NOK 900 per child and NOK 1 200 for children between 17 and 20.
Table A2. Minimum Tax Allowances
Gross income (NOK)
	






2000 - 9500 	 .4Y + 1200
	
9500 - 10000 	 5000
	
10000 - 16000 	 .04Y + 4600
	
16000 - 17500 	 .14Y + 3000
	
17500 - 31000 	 .10Y + 3700
	
31000 - 	 6800
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Rm + RF 	 SI(Rm+RF)
O-. 	 7 000 	 0 	 0- 14 000 	 0
	
7 000 - 32 000 	 27.4 	 14 000 - 48 000 	 27.4
	
32 000 - 41 000 	 33.4 	 48 000 - 60 000 	 33.4
	
41 000 - 58 000 	 38.4 	 60 000 - 77 000 	 38.4
	
58 000 - 69 000 	 43.4 	 77 000 - 88 000 	 43.4
	
69 000 - 79 000 	 49.4 	 88 000 - 98 000 	 49.4
	
79 000 - 89 000 	 55.4 	 98 000 - 108 000 	 55.4
	
89 000 - 106 000 	 60.4 	 108 000 - 125 000 	 60.4
	
106 000 - 136 000 	 65.4 	 125 000 - 155 000 	 65.4
	
136 000 - 186 000 	 69.4 	 155 000 - 205 000 	 69.4
	
186 000 - 286 000 	 73.4 	 205 000 - 305 000 	 73.4
	
286 000 - 	 75.4 	 305 000 - 	 75.4
Table A4. Taxation of gross income
Intervals for 	 Taxes paid
gross income 	 (NOK)
(NOK)
	0- 9 000	 0
	
9 000 - 11 500 	 0.25Y - 2 250
•	11 599 - 182 400	 0.05Y
	
182 400 - 	 9 120
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Appendix 3. Measurement of inequality
A common approach for measuring inequality in distributions of
income is to employ the Gini-coefficient, which satisfies the principles of
scale invariance and transfers. The principle of scale invariance states
that inequality should remain unaffected if each income is altered by the
same proportion and it requires, therefore, the inequality measure to be
independent of the scale of measurement. The principle of transfers implies
that if a transfer of income takes place from a richer to a poorer person
without reversions of the relative positions, the inequality diminishes.
As is wellknown, the Gini-coefficient (G) is related to the Lorenz
curve (L) in the followint'way.
1
(A.7) G = f [1-2L(u)]du.
o
The Gini-coefficient offers a method for ranking distributions and
quantifying the differences in inequality between distributions. This stra-
tegy, however, suffers from certain inconveniences. Evidently, no single
measure can reflect all aspects of inequality of a distribution, only sum-
marize it to a certain extent. Consequently, it is important to have alter-
natives to the Gini-coefficient. As pointed out by Atkinson (1970), the
Gini-coefficient assigns more weight to transfers in the centre of a uni-
modal distribution than at the tails. As an alternative to the Gini-coeffi-
cient, we will employ an inequality measure (the A-coefficient) that
assigns more weight to transfers at the lower tail than at the centre and
the upper tail. The A-coefficient, see Aaberge (1986), has a similar geo-
metric interpretation and relation to the inequality curve M defined by
(A.8) m( u) _ 
ErXixgc-i(um
as the Gini-coefficient has to the Lorenz curve. Here X has distribution







If X is an income variable, then M(u) for a fixed u expresses the
ratio between the mean income of the poorest 100u per cent of the popula-
tion and the mean income of the population. As is wellknown, the egalita-
rian line of the Lorenz curve is the straight line joining the points (0.0)
and (1.1). The egalitarian line of the M-curve is the horizontal line
joining the points (0.1) and (1.1). Thus, the universe of M-curves is
bounded by a unit square, while the universe of Lorenz curves is bounded by
a triangle. Therefore visually, there is a sharper distinction between two
different M-curves than between the two corresponding Lorenz curves. Note
that the M-curve will be equal to the diagonal line (M(u)=u) if and only if
the underlying distribution is uniform (0,a) for an arbitrary a. The A-
coefficient then takes the value 0.5, while the maximum attainable value is
1 and the minimum attainable value is O.






Appendix 4. Estimates of inequality based on the Gini-coefficient
Note that Table G6 below corresponds to Table 6 in section 5.1.
Table G6. A-inequality*) in distributions of annual hours of work, gross,




Annual hours 	 Gross 	 Gross Dispos- aggre-
of work
	





1979 rules 	 .494 	 .165 	 .527 	 .231 	 _198 	 .166 	 .84
	
(.013) 	 (.009) 	 (.012) 	 (.009) 	 (.006) 	 .005)
Simulation 2:
Proportional
taxes on 	 .386 	 .090 	 .443 	 .182 	 .168 	 .168 	 1.00
earnings 	 (.012) 	 .004) 	 .011) 	 .005) 	 .004) 	 .004)
Simulation 3:
Lump-sum taxes 	 .265 	 .075 	 .325 	 .165 	 .130 	 .136 	 1.05
	
(.009) 	 (.002) 	 (.009) (.004) 	 .004) 	 .004)
Standard deviations in parenthesis.
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